Judicial Review and Parliamentary Sovereignty: Balancing Fundamental Rights with Legislative Supremacy in Pakistan
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59075/qr82ta05Keywords:
Judicial Review; Parliamentary Sovereignty; Fundamental Rights; Constitutional Supremacy; Separation of Powers.Abstract
This research examines the constitutional relationship between judicial review and parliamentary sovereignty in Pakistan, with particular emphasis on maintaining a balance between fundamental rights and legislative supremacy. The Constitution of Pakistan establishes a parliamentary democratic system while simultaneously entrusting the superior judiciary with the authority to interpret constitutional provisions and review legislative and executive actions. This dual framework has generated significant constitutional debates concerning the limits of judicial intervention, the autonomy of Parliament, and the protection of fundamental rights. The study adopts a doctrinal and qualitative legal research methodology, analysing constitutional provisions, legislation, judicial precedents, and relevant scholarly literature. It critically evaluates the evolving approach of the Supreme Court of Pakistan towards judicial review and considers whether expansive judicial intervention strengthens constitutionalism or risks undermining the democratic mandate of elected institutions. The research argues that neither absolute parliamentary supremacy nor unrestricted judicial power provides an adequate constitutional balance. Instead, constitutional supremacy, institutional restraint, separation of powers, and effective protection of fundamental rights should guide the relationship between Parliament and the judiciary. The study concludes that a principled and restrained approach to judicial review can preserve democratic legitimacy while ensuring meaningful constitutional accountability.
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