The Comparative Analysis of the Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance in the Context of the European Union and Pakistan
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59075/kf9pv092Keywords:
Institutional Investors; Corporate Governance; Shareholder Activism; Regulatory Frameworks; Emerging MarketsAbstract
Institutional investor activism has evolved into a central force in global corporate governance, reshaping corporate behavior, enhancing transparency, and influencing strategic decision-making. This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, with a specific focus on its implications within the distinct governance environments of the European Union (EU) and Pakistan. The analysis reveals a stark contrast between these two regions. In the EU, a mature and sophisticated form of activism is facilitated by a robust regulatory framework, notably the Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II), which fosters long-term, principle-based engagement. In contrast, Pakistan's landscape is characterized by concentrated family and state ownership, a legal framework with weak enforcement, and an immature fund industry, rendering institutional activism largely underdeveloped. The research core arguments highlight that while activism can be a powerful catalyst for positive change, it is also a source of new complexities, including the potential for short-termism, conflicts of interest, and the growing politicization of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues. Areas of future research suggested the exploration of hybrid governance systems with respect to emerging markets and measurement of minimum levels of investor activism.
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